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POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRM*
Erich Schanze
Precis: After discussing the general scope and limits of economic 
analysis, the paper concentrates on the Coasean neo-institutional 
approach to legal problems and outlines its consequences for the design 
and selection of legal structures. The constitution of the firm is 
viewed using two schemes of analysis. First, we consider those markets 
that determine the choice of specific institutional arrangements 
("extrinsic analysis"). Second, the paper presents a model of 
"intrinsic analysis," starting from the "nexus" view of the 
corporation, and detailing the structural ("Macro") aspect of the 
various private and public input/output relations. The institutional 
interfaces resulting from these relations, it is submitted, may be 
realistically explained usinq a triple scheme of regulatory modes 
(directive, contract, narticipation) .
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1. CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In his legal theory, Immanuel Kant disqualifies a mere 
empirical theory of law by equating it graphically to 
the wooden head in a fable by Phaedrus: " A head which 
may be beautiful, but alas! it has no brains!" (Kant, 
1798:32). In the ongoing search for substantive 
principles of justice, legal theory currently explores 
the potential and the limits of aui economic explanation. 
This is, indeed, an unprecedented and often painful 
move. Economics - a science founded on mundane terms as 
"market" and "price" —  has a parvenu appearance within 
the body of classical theories on the governance of 
human affairs. By operating on the model assumption 
that the individual strives to maximize its own utility, 
it obviously makes a virtue of selfishness (1). The 
notion that institutions are not founded in first 
principles of ethics, but rather are modalities of 
channeling transactions that are subjected to a process 
of institutional choice on a market place for 
institutions, appears to be the very realization of 
Burke's prediction that "the age of chivalry is gone. 
That of sophisters, calculators, and economists has 
succeeded and the glory of Europe is extinguished for 
ever". Kenneth Arrow refers to Burke's dictum in his 
lecture on "The Limits of Organization". He goes on to 
say: "The rather dry, recondite calculation of gains 




























































































not offer magic resolutions to difficult problems... 
Rationality, after all, has to do with means and ends 
that their relation. It does not specify why the ends 
are. It only tries to make us aware of the congruence 
or dissonance between the two. So outwardly any value 
discussion must come to a rest temporarily on unanalyzed 
postulates. There is an infinite regress as we try to 
justify one value judgment in terms of supposedly deeper 
ones". (Arrow, 1974:17).
There are certainly limits to an economic analysis of 
human behavior. I may briefly refer to the short but 
impressive papers by Coase (1978) and Nutter (1979), who 
reject current notions of economic imperialism within 
the social sciences. The seemingly higher degree of 
optimism expressed in a recent series of lectures by 
George Stigler (1980) rests on the firm basis that the
science of the self-interested individual should not be
intermingled with ethical preoccupations • To be
explicit about this at the very beginning: I do not
regard economic theory as an exlusive means of
justification individual or social action, and
consequently as a first-hand source for substantive
principles on which human conduct should be founded. It
Jshould serve as a concept of discovery, a means of 
understanding institutional context. Thus, economic 
theory could hardly replace the Kantian vision of an




























































































to accept the validity of the Kantian principles of 
moral decisions. This analytical model contains, 
however, a number rules of prudence which show in part a 
structural affinity with the formality of Kantian 
ethics: the notion of basic respect for individual 
preferences and rational choice, and the insistence on 
clear definitions of individual entitlements.
Additional features of the new approach include the 
understanding of institutions not as barriers, but as an 
open-ended and variation-rich facilitative frameworks 
for individual and collective choices and related 
transactions, as well as the postulate that every 
institutional arrangement should be so defined that it 
tends to internalize the total cost associated with a 
given transaction or activity. For those who think in 
terms of hierarchies of stable norms, the most offensive 
characteristic may be the general notion of an 
ever-changing equilibrium of institutional arrangements 
that are selected by substitution at the margin.
As in any theory, there are problem-prone interfaces 
between the model and reality. Important limits to the 
economic model lie in the conception of the individual 
wealth maximizer (who has in fact to deal with bounded 
rationality), in the problem of the initial assignment 
(or distribution) of rights, and in the relative 




























































































be used not only to analyze, but also to justify odd 
ends. The price system does not always work. If it is 
brought to the work under more complicated and more 
realistic assumptions than those of complete 
information, free competition and costless transactions, 
results are frequently imprecise or, at least, given 
only as a range of possible results within the 
boundaries of convex functions. The formal elegance of 
a marginal analysis operating with the Pareto and the 
Kaldor-Hicks criteria does not tell us, as Kenneth 
Boulding (1952) has noted in referring to the Pareto 
criterion, whether we deal with the tip of a mole's hill 
or the top of Mount Everest.
This all, in my view, does not preclude exploring the 
potential of economic analysis. It may be that we have 
to be more modest in selecting our theories. Theories 
are, almost by definition, to be scrutinized by their 
logic, coherence and completeness in explaining reality. 
A less rigid test may follow from an economic 
preoccupation: the test of the relative heuristic 
utility of a theory. It suffices to know by standards 
of intuition whether, in an problem area which is 
clouded a theory produces a net increase in 
clarification. In terms of this limited research ideal, 
a theory may be said to be useful if it produces more 
scientific benefits than scientific cost. A theory may 




























































































semantics of a stated problem and is circular in 
substance. Certain uses of systems theory and semiotics 
have exhibited this kind of scientific sterility in the 
recent past. However, the kind of analysis presented in 
the Journal of Law and Economics, in the Journal of 
Legal Studies, in the Bell Journal of Economics and in 
many leading American law reviews, and more recently in 
the International Journal of Law and Economics can 
hardly be called a sterile part of economic and legal 
research. The renewed interest in economic functions of 
legal institutions, or what might be broadly termed 
"neo-institutionalism", has had a substantial impact on 
both disciplines.
The development of transactional economics, inspired by 
the research of Coase and Williamson, may be regarded as 
one of the most important theoretical moves in economics 
since the development and reception of the game theory 
(cf. Picot, 1982). On the other hand, the economic 
impact of a specific legal arrangements has recently 
become a central and explicit theme of legal theory and 
practice. It may well be that transactional economics - 
with their explicit recognition of institutions as 
esential variables and not as remote circumstantial 
conditions in the anonymous world of the ceteres pares 
-- will lead to a unification of legal and economic 
questions in a renewed tradition of political economy. 




























































































established. Under the labels of "new political 
economy" and "economic analysis of law" one can find a 
wide variety of approaches which have a common core in 
the application of modern price theory to institutions 
but which are otherwise so diverse that further synoptic 
features are difficult to assemble. The different 
research interests of some of the most well-known 
proponents may serve as an initial orientation.
Posner (1977) and his school are chiefly concerned with 
a "positive" analysis of the common law. They constrast 
the "efficiency" of judge-made rules to those imposed by 
regulatory measures. Thereby, the are following one 
message of Coase1s I960 article which pointed 
specifically to the economic logic of Victorian 
judge-made nuisance law.
Coase (1960:137) himself is obviously less interested in 
"proving" efficiencies of judge-made law than in 
examining, in the light of cost considerations, the 
empirical variety of modes of transacting.
While the economist Coase emphasizes the economic 
functions of law, the lawyer/economist Calabresi (1970) 
stresses a more rational design of institutionalization 
in a law reform perspective. He also presents a general 
framework of regulatory modes (Calabresi/Melamed, 1972) 





























































































Williamson (1975; 1980), and more recently Schenk
(1980; 1981), are interested in the macro-aspects of
institutional design in a transactional economics 
perspective. While Williamson works mainly on the level 
of comparing broadly properties of institutional 
arrangements within the markets and hierarchies 
paradigm, Schenk applies the methodology of
transactional economics for the comparison of the
elements of political/economic systems.
2. THE COASEAN APPROACH
My interest focuses on an economic analysis of
institutional variety, to the context of economic law 
(in the broad sense of the legal organization of
subjects and objects of economic transactions). In this 
area I am confident that discriminating and selecting 
legal regimes by cost considerations is a safe and 
meaningful approach.
My current interest is to reconstruct the basis of 
analysis which was laid out by Coase in two ingenious 
articles on the theory of the firm (Coase, 1937) and the 
problem of social cost (Coase, 1960). By emphasizing 




























































































shorthand reception of the theory which found expression 
in the early expositions of the so-called property 
rights theory, which has had a considerable influence on 
the reception of this body of learning, particularly 
outside of the United States of America. This school is 
characterized by the attempt to follow one message of 
Coase1s 1960 article. It reconstructs every
institutional setting as the outcome of an individual 
bargaining process, and disqualifies any arrangement 
which - at a first (or possibly a very shy second) look 
does not readily show the features that would 
intuitively follow from a hypothetical bargaining. A 
recent paper by Furubotn (1981) on codetermination is a 
good example of this kind of analysis.
Let us briefly reconsider the Coasen approach. The 
constitution of the firm is a most suitable topic 
because it is the explicit theme of Coase's pioneering 
article of 1937. For those interested in organizational 
problems of the firm, or its various legal appearances 
the article may be disappointing. Coase (1937) is 
interested in the more general (genetic) question of the 
structure and evolution of institutions. He develops a 
theory that the market and hierarchy are involved in a 
process of substitution at the margin which is guided by 
transaction cost considerations (Cf. Schanze, 1981). 
In this view, it may be too costly to carry out a given




























































































system of internal directives employed by the firm may 
save costs in organizing the allocation of resources. 
This theory of the evolution of the firm may be 
generalized as a method of evaluating the efficiency of 
a specific institutional regime. In using price theory 
as a method of institutional choice, Coase does not 
simply extend the neoclassical analysis to different 
objects. The method assumes institutional competition 
but not in a frictionless world. Positive transaction 
costs are the key to institutional variation. A good 
illustration is Coase1s note on the relation of market 
and planning:
"It is easy to see when the State takes over the 
direction of an industry that, in planning it, it 
is doing something which was previously done by 
the price mechanism. What is usually not realised 
is that any business man in organising the 
relations between his departments is also doing 
something which could be organised through the 
price mechanism. There is therefore point in Mr. 
Durbin's answer to those who emphasise the 
problems involved in economic planning that the 
same problems have to be solved by business men in 
the competitive system. The important difference 
between these two cases is that economic planning 
is imposed on industry while firms arise
voluntarily because they represent a more efficient method of organizing production. In a 
competitive system, there is an "optimum" amount 
of planning". (Coase, 1937:389 n.3).
If Coase's method is valid, it changes the economic
conception of legal institutions. In the neoclassical
tradition, law is regarded as one constant constraining
factor in the environment of the economic decision. In




























































































joint and unseverable evaluation of the product-specific 
and transaction-specific (institutional, informational, 
transportational) characteristics. If I interpret the 
szenario correctly, law is viewed as a variable system 
of alternative institutional arrangements which is open 
for choice according to cost considerations. Starting 
from this premise, the system has then to provide highly 
selective institutions which mobilize and facilitate 
transactions. The requisite variety and selectivity of 
institutions is again limited by cost considerations. 
Advantages of standardization of institutional design 
may offset advantages of extreme selectivity. Hence, in 
a system of rational institutional choice there is sin 
equilibrium of standard conceptions (cogent and 
dispositive law, standard contracts trade or industry 
usages) and individual institutional variety (3).
Coase's article on social cost (1960) adds further 
dimensions to this mode of thought. In the earlier 
article, Coase works from the perspective of a single 
actor who evaluates cost and benefits an arrangement. 
In his famous demonstration that the conventional 
Pigouvian analysis of external effects is superficial, 
he shifts the focus to the interdependence of cost 
functions of parties who are arranging for a 
Pareto-superior move. If one looks at the total cost of 
a given arrangement, the so-called "externality" becomes 




























































































cannot be determined ex ante from a unilateral 
perspective, but that they are always the product of 
reciprocal consideration. Thereby, institutional choice 
becomes a part of a reciprocal optimization process 
considering the total value of production in the light 
of possible alternatives of transacting. Only in the 
neo-classical world of zero transaction costs is the 
initial definition of the institutional arrangement 
without allocative effects and, consequently, 
irrelevant. Such a conception is as strange as the 
physical world zero friction (Stigler, 1972:12).
Obviously, this approach has consequences for the 
institutional design in a world of positive transaction 
costs. An efficient legal system will be characterized 
not only by an equilibrium between opposing trends 
towards variety and standarization of institutions, but 
by two additional premises: a clear definition of 
entitlements of the decision-making unit (explicitness); 
and the propositon that institutional arrangements 
should be so defined that they include the total cost of 
transacting, and thus internalize externalities 
(internalizaton bias. These two premises are normative 
desiderata. They have to be "produced" and "maintained" 
by the constitutional order; they are not automatic 





























































































With respect to general forms of entitlements, modern 
economic analysis works with property rules (exclusive 
entitlements), liability rules (an infringement of 
rights is possible without prior consent, but requires 
compensation), and taxes and subsidies 
(Calabresi/Melamed, 1972; Polinsky, 1979; 1980). 
Taxes and subsidies are probably a variety of the more 
general modality of pooling and redistributing. These 








Following this line of economic analysis of law, I
propose to view institutional evolution as a dual
process of (1) offering a broad variety of institutional 
designs that have the properties of both explicitness 
and internalization bias (and thus reject those 
solutions which do not meet these requirements through 
political/professional consensus) and of (2) choosing 
between the so-defined institutional alternatives by the 
actors with the purpose to individualize the 
institutional environment of their concern 
(institutional choice).
If institutional designs are framed - as they are 
typically - as packages of normative arrangements, there 
may be an institutional competition between these 




























































































aspect under the rubric of "extrinsic analysis". In 
contrast I will use the term "intrinsic analysis" for 
describing the selection of more individualized 
institutional components, or "institutional modules." 
Here, I envisage a structural or "macro" analysis, which 
I will briefly outline in this paper, and a "micro" 
analysis which would detail complex macro structures , 
and thereby reach the ordinary legal rule level in its 
most complex aspects.
3. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRM
Let us now turn to the constitution of the large 
corporation. Given the complexity of legal relations 
relevant to the constitution of the corporation it is 
obvious that we do not deal with a classic example of 
application. A series of general propositions may be 
offered by simply activating single elements of the 
theory (4).
3.1 Extrinsic Analysis: Markets for Institutions
I have already referred to Coase's general explanation 
of the nature of the firm, which may be called a mode of 
extrinsic analysis of the firm. The market decides 




























































































given set of transactions. A related scheme of analysis 
is applied by Manne (1967) to explain the process of 
institutional differentiation within the concept of the 
corporation. The different forms of the large and 
publically owned to the small, closely held corporation 
are regarded as responses to the different markets which 
control corporate inputs. In the case of the large 
corporation, Manne distinguishes three such markets: 
the market for capital, the market for securities and 
the market for corporate control. In this vein Mertens 
and I have argued that the scheme of codetermination 
presented in the 1976 German Act might relate to a new, 
fourth market controlling the large corporation —  
namely, a market of competing codetermined and non 
co-determined business organizations (Mertens, Schanze, 
1979). The Germain solution, which permits a choice 
between the two forms of organizing rights employees' 
follows a pattern of institutional design consonant with 
the principle of openness for variety.
Another kind of understanding of Coase's 
market/hierarchy paradigm is found in a recent article 
by Brinkmann and Kèbler (1981). They argue that 
legislative action leading to institutional 
codetermination is a way of saving transaction costs, 
because it avoids complex bargaining about the issue. 
Furubotn (1981) and others (Pejovich 1978, Jensen, 




























































































rights are hardly created through voluntary arrangements 
between capital owners/managers and employees (an 
argument which would require more empirical scrutiny) 
the legal imposition would be per se inefficient. 
Without assessing here the validity of these views, it 
is safe to say that both lines of argumentation depart 
from the Coasean analysis because they do not engage in 
real world comparisons between the costs of selectivity 
and of standardization (5). In general I have argued 
elesewhere (Schanze, 1983) that the current 
instrumentalism in the application of corporate laws may 
be explained as an effort to stress selectivity.
Extrinsic analysis of the demonstrated kind may serve as 
a helpful general tool for explaining the coordinating 
properties of institutions and their relation to the 
relative availability of resources. An example which is 
relevant to the current issue of codetermination may 
illustrate the point. In the discussion about the 
constitution of business enterprises it has become 
standard practice to ask why classical corporate law 
concentrates on the issue of organizing the capital 
input alone, instead of coordinating both financial and 
human capital (cf. Vanberg, 1982). The textbook 
explanation resorts to the "invention" of limited 
liability, and its obvious advantages for capital 
suppliers. Under the umbrella of limited liability, 




























































































wealth and to share in the fruits of the whole 
investment. The analysis presented here suggests to 
look at the relative historical shortages of corporate 
inputs and to scrutinize their relative institutional 
development. At a time when corporate law developed, 
finance capital was as short in supply as were the 
institutional ofms for pooling such capital. Modern 
saving and banking systems were as undeveloped as was 
financing within the corporate format. The supply of 
requisite human capital in the early phases of 
industrialization (workers which could be trained on the 
job) was ample; the liberal labor contract existed as a 
standardized and cheap modality of transacting. 
Moreover, innovation was carried out by outside 
inventors or by owner/investors.
The economic situation in which we find codetermination 
schemes is obviously different. Today, modes of pooling 
and supplying capital to industrial ventures are 
manifold. The institutional framework is adapted to 
high mobility and allocative efficiency of capital 
flows; in this perspective the supply of financial 
capital may be regarded as ample. However, the obvious 
need for highly skilled and innovative human capital, 
and the perpetuation of trial and error procedures in 
the respect to the institutional side, indicate the 
existence of a scarcity which will likely stimlulate 




























































































capital of this kind into the firm. In this area we may 
not yet have reached the requisite variety of 
institutional designs to permit an optimal institutional 
choice. To generalize the point, complex resources such 
as capital, manpower, innovative skills cannot be 
defined in terms of a "physical" availability, but must 
also be defined as functions of the relative 
institutional development associated with such 
resources. Legal concepts are likely reflecting 
specific institutional and physical shortages as they 
exist in a particular historical setting.
3.2 Intrinsic Analysis: The Nexus Model of the
Corporation
Ownership of capital is central to the traditional legal 
concept of the corporation. The neo-institutional
school of economists points out that the firm can hardly 
be explained as a function of one single input. Rather, 
they suggest that all relevant inputs should be 
considered. This has led to the elaboration of a 
fertile model of intrinsic analysis of the corporation: 
the "set of contracts" or "nexus" perspective of the 
firm (Alchain, Demsetz, 1972; Jensen, Heckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980).




























































































"Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The 
firm is just the set of contracts covering the way 
inputs are joined to create outputs and the way 
receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. In 
this "nexus of contracts" perspective, ownership 
of the firm is an irrelevant concept."
Fama (1980:289) summarizes his conclusions as follows:
"We first set aside the typical presumption that a 
corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. 
The attractive concept of the entrepreneur is also 
laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the 
large modern corporation. Instead, the two 
functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur, management and risk bearing, are treated as 
naturally separate factors within the set of 
contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined 
by competition from other firms, which forces the 
evoluton of devices for efficiently monitoring the 
performance of the entire team and of its 
individual members. In addition, individual 
participants in the firm, and in particular its 
managers, face both the discipline and 
opportunities provided by the markets for their 
services, both within and outside of the firm."
The nexus theory does not recognize a vested priority of 
one single input. It thus may serve to describe both 
"capitalistic" or "laboristic" types of firms. Fama 
does not consider the problem of codetermination. He 
addresses himself specifically to the problem of 
organizing the managerial input. He develops a theory 
that managerial behavior is not controlled by the grant 
of a residual claim, on the firm's receipts for for its 
outputs, as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) asserted, but 
that managerial behavior is monitored by outside and 
inside markets for managers. Fleischmann (1983:24) uses 
this line of argument to explain why owner/entrepeneurs 




























































































Germany (cf. Cable, FitzRoy, 1980), while German 
managers are likely to oppose such schemes:
"An owner/entrepeneur who introduces 
codetermination may be irritated by being called 
on outsider in his market. However, as long as 
his customers accept his products, this negative 
judgment is likely to be irrelevant. Managers, 
who are dependent on their reputation on the 
market for managers, face a different situation. 
They are in a precarious situation if they do not 
observe the prevailing judgment of the business 
community".
In a more general way of course this statement reveals 
the importance of prevailing tastes for formulating of 
institutional arrangements which will be attractive for 
a specific class of input owners.
3.3 Variation of the Nexus Model: A Research Program
The conventional model of the corporation starts from 
the assumption that a specific way of contributing 
financial capital to a productive unit defines the 
structure of the corporation. The corporation is viewed 
as an institutional scheme for organizing the interests 
of "owners" or equity contributors. This specific class 
of capital contributors and its institutional conception 
(common ownership/shareholding) forms the centre of the 
organizational structure. All other inputs are 




























































































"outside" markets (labor market, market for technical 
and administrative know-how, non-equity capital market, 
etc.). Some inputs are conceived as being "physically" 
integrated into the corporation (managers, employees) 





























































































Diagram 1 : Business Corporation, conventional model
state
The nexus model of the firm discards the notion of a
vested priority of one specific input. Rather, it
stresses that all input/output . relations should be
analyzed as interlocking functions of the corporate
concept. These relations are of course subject to
change over time. During the last 200 years these
>functions have been modified, differentiated into 
subfunctions, or substituted through the process of 
institutional choice.
In Diagram 2, I have listed typical input/output 
relations relevant for the modern corporate nexus. I 
have distinguished eleven aggregate actors which 
typcially engage in input/output relations within the 
nexus of the large corporation. They are listed 
clockwise as: the state, intermediary organizations;




























































































liabilities; employees; labor managers; managers; 
shareholders; bondholders; banks; and productive 
input owners.
Djagram 2 : Business Corporation, noxvis model




In this model, the "constitution" of the corporation is 
defined by the constitution of the institutional 
"interfaces" of the various input/output relations. The 
initial nexus model as used by Alchian, Demsetz (1972), 
Jensen, Keekiing (1976), and Fama (1980) relies solely 
on a contractual interface. In their conception every 
input/output relation is described as a contractual 
arrangement. This appears to be remnant of the early 
property rights theory. It has already been mentioned 




























































































Polinsky, 1979; 1980) has replaced the original
contract (or property rule) approach by working with a 
triple scheme consisting of property rule (contract), 
liability rule (decision by a third party assessing 
economic losses caused by unilateral actions), and 
taxes/subsidies (creation of an authority for pooling 
and redistributing). These three basic options for 
regulating (in a broad sense) an input/output relation 
relate to another triple scheme for describing the 
constitutional modes of regulation, i.e. the basic 
procedures which are applied in modern mixed economies 
to deal with legal issues of economic concern. Here, 
three legal modes of regulating institutional interfaces 
may be indicated, displaying an affinity to the original 
triple scheme. These modes of regulation are
(1) directive (general laws, indicative planning, 
administration),
(2) contract (ad hoc coordination), and
(3) participation (through representation and voting).
Every regulatory mode may have specific efficiency 
properties in the individual case. Of course, one could 
argue that a membership commitment, or even a directive 
(as, for example, an order to pool through taxation and 
to redistribute) may be explained as a contract in a 
very broad sense (social contract). However, this does 
not seem to be a meaningful use of the term "contract", 




























































































coordination of the interests of consenting parties. 
The concept presented here is elaborated in Diagram 3 
(regulatory interface, state —  corporation).
Diagram 3: Regulatory interface, state —  corporation 
structural (macro) level









taxes , production 
human capital 
civil liabilities for 
harmful activities













amenities for political/ 
bureaucratic elites, remune­
ration
supervisory and voting rights
i nt.'. rmedi.iry organization suasion suas ion
Extrinsic control mechanisms : 1. "market for states" (regions, industry Locations)
concerning resource endowment, infrastructure including laws
2. "market for corporations"




























































































I have chosen the state —  corporation interface as a 
first illustration to demonstrate that, in this model, 
"public" inputs/outputs are analytically similar to 
classical "private" input/output relations. The state 
is viewed as a "super #irm" (Coas«#», »1960) producing 
specific corporate inputs and consuming specific 
corporate outputs. It is however constitutionally 
privileged in one respect: As an actor, it may make 
extensive use of the directive as a means of regulation 
(it may even be constitutionally bound to use this form 
exclusively as a matter of its prerogative, cf. 
Daintith, 1978). In the actual practice of mixed 
economies, of course, ther is ample evidence for 
contractual and participatory commitments of the state 
in various industries. This is particularly evident in 
the regulation of basic industries in developing 
countries (cf. Schanze, 1981).
f
However, other actors concerned with classical private 
input/output relations also resort to directive and 
participatory modes of regulation if this appears to be 
an appropriate framework for structuring their specific 
relations. In his article on the nature of the firm,
Coase (1937) has shown the economic logic of the
♦  *  •*>substituton of market transactions through directed 
transactions and vice versa. The present mix of
regulatory modes is also visible in the employee 




























































































labor contract remains an important regulatory structure 
of the institutional interface. In addition, labor and 
management have created an intermediary structure of 
collective agreements which frequently assumes the 
characteristics of directive or quasi-legal
arrangements. Moreover, the actors concerned have used 
legislation as a means of regulating some specific 
problem areas. Sometimes, the actors have also resorted 
to participatory regulation, in some cases explicit 
codetermination. They have used this option to a 
varying degree depending on the organizational 
preferences of the actors in various countries and in 
various industries.
The plurality of actors and interfaces contained in the 
model demonstrates that a change of the institutional 
structure of one interface may have consequences for a 
multitude of input/output relations. Every change 
affects the institutional equilibrium and may require 
the adjustment of property rights as well as of positive 
and negative externalities in the complete nexus system. 
The Furubotn (1981) analysis, which views the 
introduction of participatory rights in the employee 
corporation interface as an "attenuation" of property 
rights in the shareholder —  corporation interface, 
arbitrarily isolates two interfaces and posits that 
there is a direct correlation between them. In so 




























































































ownership found in the conventional model of the 
business corporation, rather than working with the 
policy-neutral nexus model. Thus, it necessarily 
reaches normative conclusions.
It has been the purpose of this paper not to detail, but 
to outline a concept of positive inquiry into the 
constitution of the firm (6). I have presented the 
economic nexus explanation combined with a concept of 
basic institutional modes of regulating economic 
transactions as a program for future research. A full 
review and elaboration of the various institutional 
interfaces made in the terms offered in this model, I 
presume, could adequately demonstrate the interpretive 





























































































(1) The discovery of self-interest as motivating force
of institutional development is no propriety of 
neo-institutional economists. In his "Geist des 
roemischen Rechts" (Spirit of Roman Law) (1852:292 
seq.) the famous German jurist Rudolpf von Jhering 
celebrates selfishness as "the true and moving force 
of classical Roman law": "Selfishness is the motive
of Roman universality - selfishness .. the basic 
pattern of the Roman character." Jhering goes on to describe Roman law as "the religion of selfishness". 
Within the liberal credo this is, of course, a 
self-fulfilling analysis.
(2) A classic and concise exposition of these problems 
is given in March's (1978:593 seq.) chapter on the 
treatment of tastes.
(3) In the liberal paradigm, the equilibrium of
standard conceptions and individual institutional 
variety is understood as an antinomy of
self-determination of the individual ("party 
autonomy") vs. state intervention ("regulation" in the conventional narrow meaning). This antinomy is 
not endorsed by the theory of regulation presented 
in this paper. Specific properties of state action 
are acknowledged, but they do not form a fundamental mark of distinction. The state is viewed as one 
(important) among many actors which are involved in 
the process of institutional design and choice, and 
which thereby regulate transactions of their
concern. For the various levels of public, private 
and intermediary regulation in the present mixed 
economies, which we describe as systems of organized 
interdependence, see Mertens, Kirchner and Schanze 
(1982:71-101).
(4) A first summary of issues concerning the concept of
the corporation is found in Posner (1977:289 seq.) 
see also the excellent collection of papers in
Posner, Scott (1980).
(5) For detailed cost/benefit considerations concerning
the German scheme of codetermination see e.g.
Gaefgen (1981), Fleischmann (1983); for small
corporations see Cable, FitzRoy (1980).
(6) Other research perspectives on structural aspects 
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